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What’s So Great About 
the Declare War Clause? 
M A T T H E W  C .  W A X M A N  
Review of Noah Feldman, The Three Lives of James Madison: Genius, 
Partisan, President (Harper Collins, 2017) 
 
 
I 
I have long believed two things about 
constitutional war powers, which my 
reading of Noah Feldman’s “The Three 
Lives of James Madison” largely confirmed. 
First, James Madison was brilliant and 
prescient about many things, but the 
strategy and politics of war were not among 
them. Second, modern constitutional critics 
of an imperial presidency place too much 
weight on the declare war clause—and 
especially Madison’s statements about it.  
Madison, indeed, worried deeply about 
unchecked presidential war powers. But 
Feldman’s book shows that Madison did 
not emphasize the same risks and checks 
so often ascribed to him today, especially by 
congressionalists who invoke Madison’s 
statements about war-initiation.  
Feldman’s Madisons 
Let me start with a preliminary note about 
the book, which I really enjoyed. 
Discussions of constitutional war power 
issues make up only a very small part of the 
book, but they are important moments. I 
also interpret some of the relative silence 
about war powers as itself revealing. 
Feldman divides the book into three “lives” 
of Madison: genius, partisan, and 
president. Those descriptors largely 
correspond to three periods of Madison’s 
tremendous constitutional influence. The 
first focuses on Madison as constitutional 
architect, in which he devoted his potent 
intellect to solving, through structural 
divisions and overlapping powers, a core 
dilemma: how to centralize certain powers 
needed for the new republic to survive and 
thrive, while at the same time preserving 
broad distribution of power, including 
among the states. The second describes 
Madison as a political partisan in 
Congress—one who originally feared the 
rise of “factions” but comes to lead one with 
Jefferson, “the Republicans,” against 
Alexander Hamilton and “the Federalists.” 
The third covers Madison as a foreign 
policy executive, including eight years as 
President Jefferson’s secretary of state and 
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eight years as president. Much of that 
decade and a half is spent wrestling with 
how to protect U.S. interests against 
stronger foreign powers, ultimately 
including waging a Second Revolutionary 
War against Britain (the War of 1812) that 
Madison had tried unsuccessfully to avoid. 
Feldman’s book traces several evolutions in 
Madison’s thinking, including his thinking 
about war. Overall it is a story of grand 
theory and idealism yielding some ground 
to experience and pragmatism. I came 
away from it unimpressed by Madison’s 
early thinking about war powers but 
respecting his willingness to revisit and 
even reverse some of his prior assumptions 
while also holding firm to certain key 
principles. 
Madison and War Powers in Theory 
Tellingly, the declare war clause doesn’t 
feature heavily in the book. It doesn’t really 
come up at all in Feldman’s story of 
Madison’s first “life” as constitutional 
inventor. That is because Madison 
expected other, more important structural 
checks to operate before war declaration 
even became an option. It’s Congress’s 
control of spending on military 
preparedness and the preservation of state 
militias that appear many times, that loom 
much larger in Madison’s thinking about 
checks, and that were nearly his own 
undoing as commander in chief. 
Pretty much every student of the U.S. 
Constitution knows that the declare war 
clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11) 
grants Congress the power to declare war. 
Less remembered and certainly less 
discussed these days is that the militia 
clauses then provide that Congress shall 
have power to “provide for calling forth the 
Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, 
suppress Insurrections and repel 
Invasions” (Clause 15) and to “provide for 
organizing, arming, and disciplining, the 
Militia, and for governing such Part of 
them as may be employed in the Service of 
the United States, reserving to the States 
respectively, the Appointment of the 
Officers, and the Authority of training the 
Militia according to the discipline 
prescribed by Congress” (Clause 16).  
The militia clauses should be read in 
tandem with the Army and Navy clauses, 
which give Congress the powers to “raise 
and support Armies” (Clause 12) and to 
“provide and maintain a Navy” (Clause 13). 
The Army clause contains an important 
restriction—a restriction applicable to only 
one power—that “no Appropriation of 
Money to that Use shall be for a longer 
Term than two Years.”  
Article II Section 2 later familiarly states 
that, in addition to holding “the Executive 
power,” the President “shall 
be Commander in Chief of the Army and 
Navy of the United States, and of the 
Militia of the several States, when called 
into the actual Service of the United 
States.” 
Though Part I of Feldman’s book hardly 
mentions the declare war clause—and with 
it, the broader issue of war initiation—I 
suspect this is not because Madison the 
constitutional architect thought it 
unimportant. Quite the contrary, he and 
many other drafters thought it so clearly 
necessary that it didn’t generate as much 
debate or require as much defense as some 
other provisions related to war and 
defense—even though it was quite a radical 
departure from the British system and 
predominant thinking. True, there was 
some disagreement (a small minority of 
delegates proposed vesting the power to 
declare war in the president or the Senate, 
and there is a famous moment when a 
proposal that Congress be given power to 
“make war” was changed to “declare” it). 
But Madison and most other constitutional 
architects who thought it much safer to 
place the war declaration power in 
Congress’s hands met with little 
resistance, and therefore didn’t need to 
devote much energy to defending that 
allocation or its precise boundaries. In fact, 
from the framing and ratification periods 
we have very little hard evidence of what 
Madison said about the declare war 
clause’s meaning, let alone what he really 
thought. 
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Far more than the declare war clause, 
Feldman’s account of Madison’s thinking 
and influence focuses on Congress’s other 
powers over military resources as well as 
the Militia Clauses. Madison and many 
fellow Republicans saw peacetime 
demobilization of military forces—much of 
them remaining in the form of local, part-
time citizen-soldiers organized primarily at 
the state level—as the more significant 
check on war-making. Today we are used to 
thinking about congressional control over 
military purse-strings as, if anything, 
mostly a back-end check, or a tool that 
Congress might try to wield to terminate 
military adventures. Madison saw it as a 
front-end check, too, denying the president 
much actual military power without 
Congress’s considered support.  
That is, rather than seeing the declare war 
clause as the key brake on aggressive or 
unnecessary presidential war-making, 
Madison saw it as one among layers of 
checks. At least as important, and probably 
more important, were structural checks on 
the very instrument of war-making: 
namely, an army.  
Madison did not expect Congress to raise 
and support much of an army in peacetime. 
He and fellow Republicans expected state-
level militias to provide much of the 
defense forces necessary to supplement a 
small national force. And militias were—in 
both practical and legal senses—
necessarily defense forces: In accordance 
with ancient British tradition, the militia 
clauses restricted their national role to 
executing law, suppression insurrections, 
and repelling invasions. Madison never 
went as far as some Republicans who 
wanted the Constitution to forbid a 
peacetime standing army altogether (see 
his debate with fellow Virginian Patrick 
Henry at page 235 of Feldman’s book). But 
the Army clause contains a two-year 
appropriation rule to make sure that, even 
if an army was created and the president 
was provided by Congress—or assumed 
authority—to use it, funding for those 
troops would run out quickly if Congress 
did not replenish it.  
Although Feldman doesn’t discuss this part 
of Madison’s Federalist 41, it is in that 
essay that Madison describes these 
interlocking checks. Madison starts by 
quickly dismissing any question of whether 
the national government must have the 
power to declare war—“No man will 
answer this question in the negative”—but 
he doesn’t bother here addressing which 
branch holds that power, because his 
primary concern here is the instruments of 
war. Madison’s main point is that the 
Constitution was designed to make a large 
standing army unnecessary and unlikely.  
For starters, Madison argues in Federalist 
41, “[t]he distance of the United States 
from the powerful nations of the world”—
the Atlantic oceanic moat—would provide a 
first line of defense. Next, “[t]he Union 
itself which [the Constitution] cements and 
secures, destroys every pretext for a 
military establishment which could be 
dangerous. America, united with a handful 
of troops, or even without a single soldier, 
exhibits a more forbidding posture to 
foreign ambition than America disunited, 
with one hundred thousand veterans ready 
for combat.” This last point is a Madisonian 
assumption that Feldman points out 
throughout his book: A single, united 
republic would be such an economic 
powerhouse and trading partner that 
extensive national-level military 
institutions could remain small. “Next to 
the effectual establishment of the Union” 
itself as a check, Madison continues, “the 
best possible precaution against danger 
from standing armies, is a limitation of the 
term for which revenue may be 
appropriated to their support.” The Army 
clause was carefully designed so that no 
appropriations for it could last longer than 
any House of Representatives term. 
I’ve wondered in the past how seriously to 
take these arguments in the Federalist: 
was this truly Madison’s thinking or 
political salesmanship? I find convincing 
the account in Richard H. Kohn’s Eagle and 
Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of 
the Military Establishments in America, 
1783-1802 that most of the Framers, and 
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especially those who experienced the 
Revolutionary War first-hand, regarded a 
national army as necessary and the militia 
system as no substitute (see Kohn’s chapter 
5). But Feldman’s book suggests 
throughout that Madison’s own concern 
about standing military establishment and 
his faith in militias were actually quite 
strong and genuine—even if not to the 
same extent as more hardcore Republicans. 
In sum, Madison’s thinking about war 
powers—perhaps better termed “defense 
powers”— reflected two basic policies. One 
was opposition to offensive or aggressive 
war. The other was aversion to a large 
standing army. These were closely related, 
because Madison, like other Republicans, 
saw standing armies as tools of aggressive 
war, and both wars and standing armies 
threatened balances and limitations of 
domestic governance. Madison and many 
Republicans were concerned about 
aggressive war and standing armies not 
just because they opposed costly, militarily 
hawkish foreign policy but because they 
feared resulting tyranny at home. 
As Feldman puts it: 
To Madison, the message for 
Americans was to avoid war, which not 
only destroyed lives, wasted treasure, 
and corrupted morals, but destroyed 
“the equilibrium of the departments of 
power.” This was a typically 
Madisonian argument: War was hell—
especially because it broke down the 
separation of powers. Even the mere 
threat of war could produce the same 
results: “An alarm is proclaimed—
Troops are raised—Taxes are 
imposed—officers military and civil are 
created.” Then, even after “the danger 
is repelled or disappears,” the standing 
army, the taxes, and the government 
offices ripe for political corruption 
would all persist. (423) 
With these internal dangers of war—and 
even preparedness for war—in mind, 
Madison envisioned a set of overlapping 
checks that operated prior to any war 
declaration process (and afterwards if 
necessary).  
This vision sets up one of the great 
Madison-Hamilton divides over grand 
strategy and the Constitution that 
continues throughout American history. 
For Madison, some limited, standing 
military establishment was necessary, but 
too much of it would result in unwarranted 
militarism. His rival Alexander Hamilton 
feared too little of it would undermine 
deterrence and invite aggression by others. 
II 
Madison’s theory of war powers was 
focused heavily on internal dangers to 
liberty and republican governance from 
war or standing armies. The allocation of 
the declare war power to Congress played 
only a small role in his theory. More 
important were structural checks on 
national-level military establishments, 
especially constitutional provisions that 
preserved state militias as the primary 
source of military manpower and that 
required Congress to fund—and then keep 
funding—a national army. Without an 
army, the president couldn’t fight a war 
regardless of where the declare war power 
laid. 
Despite some important continuities, many 
of parts of Madison’s theory failed in 
practice during the early republic, 
including his own presidency. 
Madison and War Powers in Practice 
Even in an 18th-century world in which the 
international legal distinction between war 
and peace was sharper than it is today, 
Madison seemed caught off guard during 
the Washington and Adams 
administrations by the degree to which 
presidents could make major decisions for 
the nation about war absent any 
declaration by Congress. Upon his own rise 
to the presidency, the state militia system 
in which he placed much faith betrayed 
him. 
Neutrality Controversy 
The first major war episode that Feldman 
details is the 1793 Neutrality Controversy, 
in which President Washington 
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unilaterally announced a policy of 
impartiality in the European war, rejecting 
the view of Jefferson and substantial public 
opinion that the United States should align 
with France. To Washington and his chief 
adviser Hamilton, this exercise of 
presidential executive and diplomatic 
powers was, in effect, declaring “not war”—
but to opponents like Madison it was a 
usurpation of power over war/peace 
decisions, nonetheless.  
This was Madison’s first big practical 
lesson that the movement from baseline 
peace to exceptional war can take many 
non-linear paths. The express provisions of 
the Constitution—in particular the declare 
war clause—would cover only some of 
them. 
In my view Hamilton bested Madison in 
their dueling constitutional commentary 
during this incident under the pseudonyms 
Pacificus and Helvidius. Feldman also 
points out, however, that the embryonic 
executive branch was already nimble 
enough to exercise foreign policy 
leadership, and to fill in constitutional gaps 
through its actions. Arguments were 
important, but deeds were establishing 
precedents for expanded presidential 
diplomacy regarding war and peace. This 
was especially true during the so-called 
“Genêt affair,” when the French minister to 
the United States tried to undermine 
American neutrality by commissioning 
privateers and threatening to take his case 
directly to the public. “The theoretical 
nature of Madison’s constitutional critique 
of Pacificus was particularly ill-timed,” 
writes Feldman. “As Madison was 
ruminating about obscure details of the 
separation of powers, Hamilton was 
turning the Genêt affair into concrete 
political gain.” (Page 381). 
Quasi-War with France 
During the first Adams administration, the 
United States and France waged an 
undeclared military conflict mostly at sea 
(1798-1800). French attacks on American 
shipping, especially in the West Indies, 
combined with other factors leading to 
armed hostilities. Congress provided the 
executive branch with naval and other 
military resources and authorized, in an 
escalating series of legislative acts, more 
and more forceful measures.  
Note that this was primarily a naval 
conflict, which itself posed some challenges 
for Madison’s war powers ideas (which 
were mostly about armies). President 
Adams had to convince Congress to 
continue funding a Navy, and he was 
cautious to get specific authorization for 
using it. But that was probably an easier 
political lift than supporting ground 
hostilities, because armies were generally 
seen as a greater risk to liberty (a feature 
that, besides the need for longer-term 
capital investment, is probably one reason 
why the Navy Clause does not contain the 
Army’s two-year limitation).  
During that episode, Madison penned a 
letter to Jefferson in which he famously 
wrote his strongest statement about the 
declare war clause:  
The Constitution supposes what the 
history of all governments 
demonstrates, that the executive is the 
branch of power most interested in 
war, and most prone to it. It has 
accordingly with studied care, vested 
the question of war in the legislature. 
(Page 424, citing a 1798 letter to 
Jefferson).  
In some ways it is no surprise that Madison 
emphasized Congress’s war power here: 
Having realized what presidents could do 
without formally declaring war, he 
emphasized more than before that 
Congress should be in charge. 
Modern-day lawyers who oppose unilateral 
resort to armed force by the president often 
cite this statement about the war 
declaration power in support of their views. 
But Feldman’s book places it in context. 
The legislature was, in fact, already quite 
involved in decision-making, having 
fulfilled requests for armaments and 
authorized limited military actions. 
Moreover, Adams was actually struggling 
to avoid open conflict with France, not 
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baiting the nation into one.  
Madison seems blinded to these factors 
because he wanted war to be a binary 
condition—we were either at (declared) 
war or not. He thought that approach 
would make war easier to control. 
“Madison reviled the idea of undeclared 
war,” explains Feldman (Page 414). That’s 
why Madison says the framers “vested the 
question of war in the legislature” (my 
emphasis). It is also why he goes on the say 
that “the doctrines lately advanced,” by 
which he means congressional 
authorization of limited military actions 
without declaring war, “strike at the root of 
all these provisions, and will deposit the 
peace of the country in that department 
which the Constitution distrusts as most 
ready without cause to renounce it.”  
But the Constitution needed to better fit 
the realities and strategy of conflict, not the 
other way around. And those realities 
included that interstate conflict entails a 
set of moves and countermoves, threats 
and counter-threats, only sometimes 
resulting in full-scale conflict for which a 
legal declaration would be advantageous. 
Madison’s First Term as President 
Madison served as secretary of state 
throughout the Jefferson administration, 
during which the United States was 
pushed around by Britain on many fronts, 
including in maritime commerce. Feldman 
describes in detail how Madison and 
Jefferson sought and failed to negotiate 
British concessions through economic 
coercion, and Madison inherits the 
challenge when elected president. 
Notwithstanding these and other security 
challenges, in his 1809 inaugural address, 
Madison clings to his republican concerns 
about centralized military establishment, 
warning that a standing army was a 
danger to liberty and must therefore be 
kept “within the requisite limits” while 
“remembering that an armed and trained 
militia is the firmest bulwark of republics” 
(504). 
As Feldman notes, of course, “[w]ar was not 
a viable option for a republic without a 
standing army” (504). That may not have 
seemed so problematic to Madison, who 
had no intention of going to war. But 
coercive diplomacy or deterrence backed up 
by the threat of force were not possible 
without a standing army, either. Nor was 
an aggressive foreign economic policy that 
risked escalating to or provoking war.  
So by 1811 Madison had learned a key 
strategic lesson that cuts at his republican 
theory of war powers: that a standing 
military may be necessary for strategies—
like deterrence, or threatening an 
escalation of economic measures—that 
could prevent war. “With every avenue of 
economic sanctions apparently exhausted, 
all that remained to alter British policy 
was war.” Feldman continues, “Ideally, 
Madison would not actually have to use 
force, just threaten it. To threaten credibly, 
however, Madison would need to motivate 
Congress to create a functional military” 
(529)—something he had stood against. 
War of 1812 
Having exhausted every form of economic 
coercion he could muster, Madison turned 
in 1812 to Congress for a war declaration, 
which passed narrowly in both houses. 
Although United States ultimately 
emerges victorious, it suffered major 
setbacks throughout the war, including the 
burning of Washington, D.C. Feldman 
notes that “Congress had refused to give 
Madison the troops he needed. Most of the 
public had refused any sacrifice and 
avoided military service. The militia had 
frequently fled the field. The regular army 
had performed doubtfully at best” (606-07). 
The biggest military blunders involved 
reliance on state militias, which Madison’s 
republican theory of war powers placed at 
the center of national defense. His military 
strategy entailed invasion of Canada, but 
New York militiamen refused to cross the 
border, arguing that constitutionally they 
could not be sent abroad on offensive 
campaigns (recall that the militia clauses 
restrict the purposes for which Congress 
can call them forth: “to execute the Laws of 
the Union, suppress Insurrections and 
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repel Invasions”). Those militias that were 
willing to cross the Canadian border fought 
poorly—as one might expect of forces 
designed for local defense. Madison “was 
beginning to recognize that the federal 
government might not be able to rely on 
militia as he expected” (552). 
Eventually the United States repulsed 
British forces and scored enough victories 
to force a negotiated settlement. Feldman 
describes how, in an important concession 
to his experience over prior assumptions, 
Madison acknowledged in a post-war 
speech to Congress that: “Experience has 
taught us” … that the “pacific dispositions 
of the American people” and “their political 
institutions” would not exempt the United 
States from the need to fight wars. “A 
certain degree of preparation” was 
“indispensable to avert disaster” and would 
also give “the best security for the 
continuance of peace” (607). 
Madison’s proposals, ultimately adopted by 
Congress, called for a modest standing 
army (on the order of ten thousand troops) 
and a small standing Navy. “The 
recommendations were altogether logical 
in the light of the experience of the previous 
decade” (607)—not only the military 
setbacks during the war but the efforts to 
avoid war to begin with. 
This concession to standing national forces 
struck a balance in the decades that 
followed between defense needs (and even 
some territorial expansions through force) 
and concerns about domestic centralization 
of power. But it also laid the seeds for 
greater and greater presidential discretion 
in foreign policy as those standing forces 
grew larger. 
*** 
Reality was tough on Madison’s theory of 
war powers. Madison never proposed a 
wholesale departure from reliance on 
structural mechanisms to ensure that 
defensive measures would not encroach on 
American liberties, but he realized the 
limits of his assumption that opening up 
trade would prevent war. He came to 
accept that significant adjustments in how 
those structural checks operated were 
inevitable. The executive branch was filling 
gaps in clear constitutional allocations of 
war-related powers. Clear delineations 
between war and peace were poorly 
matched with the realities of conflict. 
Heavy reliance on state militias had to give 
way to standing national forces.  
III 
“Congressionalists”—or those who hold 
that Congress must authorize any 
significant, hostile military intervention—
often overstate the historical importance of 
the Declare War Clause and overvalue 
Madison’s arguments for that position. 
Indeed, many of today’s congressionalists 
are doing what Madison did when he was 
out of Congress and watching President 
Adams wage an undeclared war against 
France: falling back on formal text when 
constitutional structure wasn’t working as 
they would hope. 
The Congressionalist View and 
Madisonian War Powers 
I do not mean to suggest that the 
congressionalist view is singular and 
unified; there are variations of it, with 
different thresholds, standards, and 
normative justifications. And my intent 
here is not to litigate the entire debate 
between congressionalists and 
presidentialists, who hold that the 
president has vast unilateral power to use 
military force.  
I do, however, think Feldman’s book helps 
to debunk some common myths that 
congressionalists often deploy. It also 
bolsters several arguments that Philip 
Bobbitt makes in his incisive review of 
John Hart Ely’s “War and Responsibility” 
(Michigan Law Review, 1994). Among 
Bobbitt’s most important points is that, 
yes, the framers intended war to be 
legislatively authorized, but that 
legislative authorization role is more 
complex and broader than the declare war 
clause. Moreover, if we take Congress’s 
other war-related powers seriously—in 
particular, its control over creating and 
equipping the military—we cannot just 
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ignore the fact that Congress has 
affirmatively authorized a standing 
military force without putting restrictions 
on it. 
Congressionalists sometimes begin by 
noting that the declare war clause—and, 
they argue by extension, the decision to 
initiate military conflicts—was among the 
most important power constitutional 
allocations decided by the framers. Louis 
Henkin asserted in his “Foreign Affairs and 
the U.S. Constitution” that “[t]o the 
Constitutional Fathers, one might guess, 
the most important power in foreign 
relations was the power to declare war.” In 
his account of the Framers’ allocation of 
powers in “The Imperial Presidency,” 
Arthur Schlesinger called the declare car 
clause “of prime importance.” 
This is exaggerated and ahistorical, at 
least as to Madison. Of greater importance 
to Madison and his fellow Republicans 
were the Constitution’s allocation of and 
limitations on war-waging tools: 
congressionally checked spending on 
military instruments (the Army Clause) 
and reliance on state militias for military 
manpower (the militia clauses). 
Returning, however, to the declare war 
clause, perhaps no quotation on war 
powers by Madison gets more attention 
than this one, discussed in the previous 
essay: “The Constitution supposes what 
the history of all governments 
demonstrates, that the executive is the 
branch of power most interested in war, 
and most prone to it. It has accordingly 
with studied care, vested the question of 
war in the legislature.” It is one of those 
statements so venerated by many lawyers 
because Madison said it; it must therefore 
be compelling. 
There are many reasons to question the 
persuasiveness of that statement, however. 
As explained in the previous essay, 
Madison pens it during an episode—the 
Quasi-War with France during the John 
Adam administration—in which Congress 
had extensively deliberated and legislated 
about the military action, and the 
president’s strategy is best understood as 
intended to avoid full-scale war. More 
generally, given how wrong Madison 
turned out to be about the strategy of war-
prevention and the wielding of war threats, 
the politics of going to war, and the 
defensive needs even of the early Republic 
in which he served, it is surprising that so 
much stock is placed on these words. 
Declare War Clause as the Key Check? 
In any event, congressionalists often take 
the view that the Constitution was and 
should designed to make it hard to initiate 
war. They interpret the declare war clause 
as a brake—or a second congressional key 
that must be turned—on initiating military 
conflict.  
Elsewhere, from a strategic perspective, I 
have written about how this view vastly 
oversimplifies war-prevention. 
Empirically, political scientists have shown 
that even absent formal congressional 
declarations and authorizations of force, 
Congress still wields substantial influence 
over presidential decisions to use force. 
From a historical perspective, Feldman’s 
Madisons illustrate that if the Constitution 
was designed to make war difficult to 
initiate, the declare war clause was never 
expected to do all, or even a lot, of that work 
itself. 
Feldman’s story ends with the erosion of 
other checks—most significantly the 
acceptance of a standing, national army, 
which gave presidents more unilateral 
freedom of action. This has ever since put a 
lot of strain on the declare war clause as a 
final check. It has also produced the 
illusion that the declare war clause is 
Congress’s key power—and a dangerously 
degraded one—rather than seeing 
Congress as continually exercising the 
other important war powers vested in the 
legislature. As Bobbitt describes it: 
Recall now that Congress’s role in 
raising armies was, in the original 
contemplation of the Framers, by no 
means routine. The Framers did not 
anticipate that the United States 
would employ a large standing army, or 
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that Congress would have to declare 
war before raising one. Funding armed 
forces was deemed to be of such 
significance that any decision to field 
an army had to be revisited every two 
years (1390). 
Bobbitt continues: 
What confuses us today is the presence 
of standing armies whose 
authorizations and appropriations 
have become more or less routine, even 
permanent parts of the statutory 
background. Thus members of 
Congress are inclined to feel they have 
authorized nothing—certainly not 
hostile action—when they have 
approved large, heavily armed forces 
whose only justification can be that 
they are prepared to fight (1390). 
In other words, it is in part because other 
checks on presidential war-making no 
longer operate as originally envisioned that 
the declare war clause now seems of 
towering importance—it is, to many critics 
of imperial presidentialism, the last check 
standing. 
But if the relative importance of the declare 
war clause over other war power checks 
has increased over time, a final lesson is 
that the stakes of that power allocation 
have changed dramatically since the 
founding era, too. It is usually assumed 
that the risks associated with war-
initiation powers have increased because 
war itself has become so much more 
potentially destructive. But in other ways 
the stakes are much lower today than 
Madison assumed. 
Madison was concerned, of course, with the 
foreign policy consequences of war, but 
Feldman’s book shows that his bigger 
concern was internal power balances. He 
was concerned about the centralizing effect 
of war on the instruments of government 
and war preparation as well as about the 
aggrandizement of executive power. But as 
the growth in standing U.S. military forces 
have enabled greater presidential 
discretion in U.S. security policy abroad, 
the growth of the federal administrative 
state, as well as expanded emergency 
powers independent of war, have also given 
the modern president levers of internal 
control unimaginable to Madison.  
Put another way, Madison feared that 
presidents would be prone to war justify 
their accumulation of resources and power 
domestically; but modern presidents 
already have so much of that at their 
disposal. Sure, war is used to justify 
additional exceptional measures (such as 
expanded wartime detention or 
surveillance powers) and there may be 
other political reasons why presidents 
might find war advantageous. But a state 
of war no longer unlocks anywhere near the 
otherwise-sealed domestic presidential 
power that it might have before the modern 
administrative and national security state. 
Conclusion 
To be clear, my point here is not an outright 
defense of presidentialism, or that 
congressionalists are wrong to push for 
stronger legislative involvement in force 
authorization. I think Congress does not 
exercise its powers over war as much as it 
should. My point is, rather, to cast doubt on 
undue veneration for Founding Era 
statements, especially taken out of their 
historical and strategic context, and on a 
false formalism with regard to the declare 
war clause that many congressionalists 
would not apply to other provisions. 
Feldman’s Madison is one who was 
prepared to acknowledge—eventually—
that some of his war power principles 
needed to be adapted to experience and 
strategic reality. Those who revere 
Madison today ought to bring that same 
adaptive approach to interpreting 
constitutional war powers, including the 
declare war clause. 
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